Vol. II. No. 2. January 19, 1905

The Journal of Philosophy
Psychology and Scientific Methods

THE THING AND ITS RELATIONS

EXPERIENCE in its immediacy seems perfectly fluent. The active sense of living which we all enjoy, before reflection shatters our instinctive world for us, is self-luminous and suggests no paradoxes. Its difficulties are disappointments and uncertainties. They are not intellectual contradictions.

When the reflective intellect gets at work, however, it discovers incomprehensibilities in the flowing process. Distinguishing its elements and parts, it gives them separate names, and what it thus disjoins it can not easily put together. Pyrrhonism accepts the irrationality and revels in its dialectic elaboration. Other philosophies try, some by ignoring, some by resisting, and some by turning the dialectic procedure against itself, negating its first negations, to restore the fluent sense of life again, and let redemption take the place of innocence. The perfection with which any philosophy may do this is the measure of its human success and of its importance in philosophic history. In a recent article in this Journal, 'A World of Pure Experience,' I tried my own hand sketchily at the problem, resisting certain first steps of dialectics by insisting in a general way that the immediately experienced conjunctive relations are as real as anything else.[1] If my sketch is not to appear too *naïf*, I must come closer to details, and in the present article I propose to do so.

I

'Pure experience' is the name which I gave to the original flux of life before reflexion has categorized it. Only new-born babes, and persons in semicoma from sleep, drugs, illnesses or blows can have an experience pure in the literal sense of a *that* which is not yet any definite *what*, tho' ready to be all sorts of whats; full both of oneness and of manyness, but in respects that don't appear; changing throughout, yet so confusedly that its phases interpenetrate, and no points, either of distinction or of identity, can be caught. Pure ex-

[1] Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. I., No. 20, p. 566.

perience in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation. But the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases, and these to become identified and fixed and abstracted; so that experience now flows as if shot through with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions. Its purity is only a relative term, meaning the proportional amount of sensation which it still embodies.

Far back as we go, the flux, both as a whole and in its parts, is that of things conjunct and separated. The great continua of time, space and the self envelope everything, betwixt them, and flow together without interfering. The things that they envelope come as separate in some ways and as continuous in others. Some sensations coalesce with some ideas, and others are irreconcilable. Qualities compenetrate one space, or exclude each other from it. They cling together persistently in groups that move as units, or else they separate. Their changes are abrupt or discontinuous; and their kinds resemble or differ; and, as they do so, fall into either even or irregular series.

In all this the continuities and the discontinuities are absolutely coordinate matters of immediate feeling. The conjunctions are as primordial elements of 'fact' as are the distinctions and disjunctions. In the same act by which I feel that this passing minute is a new pulse of my life, I feel that the old life continues into it, and the feeling of continuance in no wise jars upon the simultaneous feeling of a novelty. They, too, compenetrate harmoniously. Prepositions, copulas, and conjunctions, 'is,' 'isn't,' 'then,' 'before,' 'in,' 'on,' 'beside,' 'between,' 'next,' 'like,' 'unlike,' 'as,' 'but,' flower out of the stream of pure experience, the stream of concretes or the sensational stream, as naturally as nouns and adjectives do, and they melt into it again as fluidly when we apply them to a new portion of the stream.

II

If now we ask why we must thus translate experience from a more concrete or pure into a more intellectualized form, filling it with ever more abounding verbalized distinctions, Rationalism and Empiricism give different replies.

The rationalistic answer is that the theoretic life is absolute and its interests imperative, that to understand is simply the duty of man, and that who questions this need not be argued with, for by the fact of arguing he gives away his case.

The pragmatic answer is that the environment kills as well as sustains us, and that the tendency of raw experience to extinguish the experient himself is lessened just in the degree in which the elements in it that have a practical bearing upon life are analyzed out

of the continuum and verbally fixed and coupled together, so that we may know what is in the wind for us and get ready to react in time. Had pure experience, the pragmatist says, been always perfectly healthy, there would never have arisen the necessity of isolating or verbalizing any of its terms. We should just have experienced inarticulately and unintellectually enjoyed. This leaning on 'reaction' in the pragmatist account implies that, whenever we intellectualize a relatively pure experience, we ought to do so for the sake of redescending to the purer or more concrete level again; and that if an intellect stays aloft among its abstract terms and generalized relations, and does not reinsert itself with its conclusions into some particular point of the immmediate stream of life, it fails to finish out its function and leaves its normal race unrun.

Most rationalists nowadays will agree that pragmatism gives a true enough account of the way in which our intellect arose at first, but they will deny these latter implications. The case, they will say, resembles that of sexual love. Originating in the animal need of getting another generation born, this passion has developed secondarily such imperious spiritual needs that, if you ask why another generation ought to be born at all, the answer is: 'Chiefly that love may go on.' Just so with our intellect: it originated as a practical means of serving life; but it has developed incidentally the function of understanding absolute truth; and life itself now seems to be given chiefly as a means by which that function may be prosecuted. But truth and the understanding of it lie among the abstracts and universals, so the intellect now carries on its higher business wholly in this region, without any need of redescending into pure experience again.

If the contrasted tendencies which I thus designate as pragmatistic and rationalistic are not recognized by the reader, perhaps an example will make them more concrete. Mr. Bradley, for instance, is an ultra-rationalist. He admits that our intellect is primarily practical, but says that, for philosophers, the practical need is simply Truth.[2] Truth, moreover, must be assumed 'consistent.' Immediate experience has to be broken into subjects and qualities, terms and relations, to be understood as truth at all. Yet when so broken it is less consistent than ever. Taken raw, it is all undistinguished. Intellectualized, it is all distinction without oneness. 'Such an arrangement may *work*, but the theoretic problem is not solved' (p. 23). The question is '*how* the diversity can exist in harmony with the oneness' (p. 118). To go back to pure experience is unavailing. 'Mere feeling gives no answer to our riddle' (p. 104). Even if your intuition is a fact, it is not an *understanding*. 'It is a mere

[2] 'Appearance and Reality,' pp. 152–3.

experience, and furnishes no consistent view' (pp. 108–9). The experience offered as facts or truths 'I find that my intellect rejects because they contradict themselves. They offer a complex of diversities conjoined in a way which it feels is not its way and which it can not repeat as its own. . . . For to be satisfied, my intellect must understand, and it can not understand by taking a congeries in the lump' (p. 570). So Mr. Bradley, in the sole interests of 'understanding' (as he conceives that function), turns his back on finite experience forever. Truth must lie in the opposite direction, the direction of the Absolute; and this kind of rationalism and pragmatism walk thenceforward upon opposite paths. For the one, those intellectual products are most true which, turning their face towards the Absolute, come nearest to symbolizing its ways of uniting the many and the one. For the other those are most true which most successfully dip back into the finite stream of feeling and grow most easily confluent with some particular wave or wavelet. Such confluence not only proves the intellectual operation to have been true (as an addition may 'prove' that a subtraction is already rightly performed) but it constitutes, according to pragmatism, all that we mean by calling it true. Only in so far as they lead us, successfully or unsuccessfully, back into sensible experience again, are our abstracts and universals true or false at all.[3]

III

In Section VI of my recent article, 'A World of Pure Experience,' I adopted in a general way the common-sense belief that one and the same world is cognized by our different minds; but I left undiscussed the dialectical arguments which maintain that this is logically absurd. The usual reason given for its being absurd is that it assumes one object (to wit, the world) to stand in two relations at once; to my mind, namely, and again to yours; whereas a term taken in a second relation can not logically be the same term which it was at first.

I have heard this reason urged so often in discussing with absolutists, and it would destroy my radical empiricism so utterly, if it were valid, that I am bound to give it an attentive ear, and seriously to search its strength.

For instance, let the matter in dispute be a term M, asserted to be on the one hand related to L and on the other to N; and let the two cases of relation be symbolized by $L - M$ and $M - N$ respectively. When, now, I assume that the experience may immediately come and be given in the shape $L - M - N$, with no trace of

[3] Compare Professor MacLennan's admirable *Auseinandersetzung* with Mr. Bradley, in this JOURNAL, Vol. I., No. 15, p. 403 ff., especially pp. 405–407.

doubling or internal fission in the *M*, I am told that this is all a popular delusion; that $L - M - N$ means two entitatively different experiences, $L - M$ and $M - N$ namely; and that although the Absolute may, and indeed must, from its superior point of view, read its own kind of unity into *M*'s two editions, yet as elements in finite experience the two *M*'s lie irretrievably asunder, and the world is broken and unbridged between them.

In arguing this dialectic thesis, one must avoid slipping from the logical into the physical point of view. It would be easy, in taking a concrete example to fix one's ideas by, to choose one in which the letter *M* should stand for a collective noun of some sort, which noun, being related to *L* by one of its parts and to *N* by another, would inwardly be two things when it stood outwardly in both relations. Thus, one might say: 'David Hume, who weighed so many stone by his body, influences posterity by his doctrine.' The body and the doctrine are two things, between which our finite minds can discover no real sameness, though the same name covers both of them. And then, one might continue: 'Only an Absolute is capable of uniting such a non-identity.' We must, I say, avoid this sort of example, for the dialectic insight, if true at all, must apply to terms and relations universally. It must be true of abstract units as well as of nouns collective; and if we prove it by concrete examples we must take the simplest, so as to avoid irrelevant material suggestions.

Taken thus in all its generality, the absolutist contention seems to use as its major premise Hume's notion 'that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.' Undoubtedly, since we use two phrases in talking first about '*M*'s relation to *L*' and then about '*M*'s relation to *N*,' we must be having, or must have had, two distinct perceptions;—and the rest would then seem to follow duly. But the starting-point of the reasoning here seems to be the fact of the two *phrases;* and this suggests that the argument may be merely verbal. Can it be that the whole dialectic consists in attributing to the experience talked-about a constitution similar to that of the language in which we describe it? Must we assert the objective doubleness of the *M* merely because we have to name it twice over when we name its two relations?

Candidly, I can think of no other reason than this for the dialectic conclusion;[4] for, if we think, not of our words, but of any simple concrete matter which they may be held to signify, the experience itself

[4] Technically it seems classable as a fallacy 'of composition.' A duality, predicable of the two wholes, $L - M$ and $M - N$, is forthwith predicated of one of their parts, *M*.

belies the paradox asserted. We use indeed two separate concepts in analyzing our object, but we know them all the while to be but substitutional, and that the *M* in *L* — *M* and the *M* in *M* — *N mean* (*i. e.*, are capable of leading to and terminating in) one self-same piece, *M*, of sensible experience. This persistent identity of certain units (or emphases, or points, or objects, or members—call them what you will) of the experience-continuum, is just one of those conjunctive features of it, on which radical empiricism insists so emphatically.[5] For samenesses are parts of experience's indefeasible structure. When I hear a bell-stroke and, as life flows on, its after image dies away, I still hark back to it as 'that same bell-stroke.' When I see a thing *M*, with *L* to the left of it and *N* to the right of it, I see it *as* one *M;* and if you tell me I have had to 'take' it twice, I reply that if I 'took' it a thousand times I should still *see* it as a unit.[6] Its unity is aboriginal, just as, in my successive takings of it, the multiplicity is aboriginal. It comes unbroken as *that M*, as a singular which I encounter; they come broken, as *those* takings, as my plurality of operations. The unity and the separateness are strictly coordinate. I do not easily fathom why my opponents should find the separateness so much more easily understandable that they must needs infect the whole of finite experience with it, and relegate the unity (now taken as a bare postulate and no longer as a thing positively perceivable) to the region of the Absolute's mysteries. I do not easily fathom this, I say, for the said opponents are above mere verbal quibbling; yet all that I can catch in their talk is the substitution of what is true of certain words for what is true of what they signify. They stay with the words,—not returning to the stream of life whence all the meaning of them came, and which is always ready to reabsorb them.

IV

For aught this argument proves, then, we may continue to believe that one thing can be known by many knowers. But the denial of one thing in many relations is but one application of a still profounder dialectic difficulty. Man can't be good, said the sophists, for man is *man* and *good* is good; and Hegel and Herbart in their day, more recently H. Spir, and most recently and elaborately of all, Mr. Bradley, inform us that a term can logically only be a puncti-

[5] See above, p. 534 ff.

[6] I may perhaps refer here to my 'Principles of Psychology,' Vol. I., pp. 459 ff. It really seems 'weird' to have to argue (as I am forced now to do) for the notion that it is one sheet of paper (with its two surfaces and all that lies between) which is both under my pen and on the table—the 'claim' that it is two sheets seems so brazen. Yet I sometimes suspect the absolutists of sincerity!

form unit, and that even single conjunctive relations between things, such as experience seems to yield, are rationally impossible.

Of course, if true, this cuts off radical empiricism without even a shilling. Radical empiricism takes conjunctive relations at their face value, holding them to be as real as the terms united by them.[7] The world it represents as a collection, some parts of which are conjunctively and others disjunctively related. Two parts, themselves disjoined, may nevertheless hang together by an intermediary with which they are severally connected, and the whole world eventually may hang together similarly, inasmuch as *some* path of conjunctive transition by which to pass from one of its parts to another may always be discernable. Such determinately various hanging-together may be called *concatenated* union, to distinguish it from the 'through-and-through' type of union, 'each in all and all in each' (union of *total conflux,* as one might call it) which monistic systems hold to obtain when things are taken in their absolute reality. In a concatenated world a partial conflux often is experienced. Our concepts and our sensations are confluent; successive states of the same ego, and feelings of the same body are confluent. Where the experience is not of conflux, it may be of conterminousness [things with but one thing between]; or of contiguousness [nothing between]; or of likeness; or of nearness; or of simultaneousness; or of in-ness; or of on-ness; or of for-ness; or of simple with-ness; or even of mere and-ness, which last relation would make of however disjointed a world otherwise, at any rate for that occasion a universe 'of discourse.' Now Mr. Bradley tells us that none of these relations, as we actually experience them, can be real.[8] My next duty, accordingly, must be to rescue radical empiricism from Mr. Bradley. Fortunately, as it seems to me, his general contention, that the very notion of relation is unthinkable clearly, has been successfully met by many critics.[9]

[7] See above, pp. 534, 540.

[8] Here again the reader must beware of slipping from logical into phenomenal considerations. It may well be that we *attribute* a certain relation falsely, because the circumstances of the case, being complex, have deceived us. At a railway station we may take our own train, and not the one that fills our window, to be moving. We here put motion in the wrong place in the world, but in its original place the motion is a part of reality. What Mr. Bradley means is nothing like this, but rather that motion is nowhere real, and that, even in their aboriginal and empirically incorrigible seats, relations are impossible of comprehension.

[9] Particularly so by Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, in his 'Man and the Cosmos,' and by L. T. Hobbhouse, in Chapter XII. (the Validity of Judgment) of his 'Theory of Knowledge.' Other fatal reviews (in my opinion) are Hodder's, in the *Psychological Review,* I., 307; Stout's in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* 1901–2, p. 1; and MacLennan's in this JOURNAL, No. 15, 403.

It is a burden to the flesh, and an injustice both to readers and to the previous writers, to repeat good arguments already printed. So, in noticing Mr. Bradley, I will confine myself to the interests of radical empiricism solely.

V

The first duty of radical empiricism, taking given conjunctions at their face-value, is to class some of them as more intimate and some as more external. When two terms are *similar,* their very natures enter into the relation. Being *what* they are, no matter where or when, the likeness never can be denied, if asserted. It continues predicable as long as the terms continue. Other relations, the *where* and the *when,* for example, seem adventitious. The sheet of paper may be 'off' or 'on' the table, for example; and in either case the relation only involves the outside of its terms. Having an outside, both of them, they contribute by *it* to the relation. It is external: the term's inner nature is irrelevant to it. Any book, any table, may fall into the relation, which is created *pro hac vice,* not by their existence, but by their casual situation. It is just because so many of the conjunctions of experience seem so external that a philosophy of pure experience must tend to pluralism in its ontology. So far as things have space-relations, for example, we are free to imagine them with different origins even. If they could get to *be,* and get into space at all, then they may have done so separately. Once there, however, they are *additives* to one another, and, with no prejudice to their natures, all sorts of space-relations may supervene between them. The question of how things could *überhaupt* come to be is wholly different from the question what their relations, once the being accomplished, may consist in.

Mr. Bradley now affirms that such external relations as we here talk of must hold of different subjects from those of which the absence of relations could a moment previously have been asserted. Not only is the *situation* different when the book is on the table, but the *book itself* is different as a book, from what it was when it was off the table.[10] He admits that "such external relations seem possible and even existing. . . . That you do not alter what you compare

[10]Once more, don't slip from logical into physical situations. Of course, if the table be wet, it will moisten the book, or if it be slight enough and the book heavy enough, the book will break it down. But such collateral phenomena are not the point at issue. The point is whether the successive relations 'on' and 'not-on' can rationally (not physically) hold of the same constant terms, abstractly taken. Professor A. E. Taylor drops from logical into material considerations when he instances color-contrast as a proof that *A,* 'as contra-distinguished from *B,* is not the same thing as mere *A* not in any way affected' ('Elements of Metaphysics,' 1903, p. 145). Note the substitution for 'related' of the word 'affected,' which begs the whole question.

or rearrange in space seems to Common Sense quite obvious, and that on the other side there are as obvious difficulties does not occur to Common Sense at all. And I will begin by pointing out these difficulties. . . . There is a relation in the result, and this relation, we hear, is to make no difference in its terms. But, if so, to what does it make a difference? [*Doesn't it make a difference to us onlookers, at least?*] and what is the meaning and sense of qualifying the terms by it? [*Surely the meaning is to tell the truth about them.*[11]] If in short, it is external to the terms, how can it possibly be true *of* them? [*Is it the 'intimacy' suggested by the little word 'of,' here, which I have underscored, that is the root of Mr. Bradley's trouble?*] . . . If the terms from their inner nature do not enter into the relation, then, so far as they are concerned, they seem related for no reason at all. . . . Things are spatially related, first in one way, and then become related in another way, and yet in no way themselves are altered; for the relations, it is said, are but external. But I reply that, if so, I can not *understand* the leaving by the terms of one set of relations and their adoption of another fresh set. The process and its result to the terms, if they contribute nothing to it [*Surely they contribute to it all there is 'of' it!*] seem irrational throughout. [*If irrational here means simply 'non-rational,' or non-deducible from the essence of either term singly, it is no reproach; if it means 'contradicting' such essence, Mr. Bradley should show wherein and how.*] But, if they contribute anything, they must surely be affected internally. [*Why so, if they contribute only their surface? In such relations as 'on,' 'a foot away,' 'between,' 'next,' etc., only surfaces are in question.*] . . . If the terms contribute anything whatever, then the terms are affected [*altered?*] by the arrangement. . . . That for working purposes we treat, and do well to treat, some relations as external merely I do not deny, and that of course is not the question at issue here. That question is . . . whether in the end and in principle a mere external relation is possible and forced on us by the facts.''[12]

Mr. Bradley next reverts to the antinomies of space, which, according to him, prove it to be unreal, although it appears as so prolific a medium of external relations; and he then concludes that ''Irrationality and externality can not be the last truth about things. Somewhere there must be a reason why this and that appear together. And this reason and reality must reside in the whole from which terms and relations are abstractions, a whole in which their internal

[11] But "is there any sense," asks Mr. Bradley peevishly, on p. 579, "and if so, what sense in truth that is only outside and 'about' things?" Surely such a question may be left unanswered.

[12] 'Appearance and Reality,' 2d edition, pp. 575–6.

connection must lie, and out of which from the background appear those fresh results which never could have come from the premises'' (p. 577). And he adds that ''Where the whole is different, the terms that qualify and contribute to it must so far be different. . . . They are altered so far only [*How far? farther than externally, yet not through and through?*] but still they are altered. . . . I must insist that in each case the terms are qualified by their whole [*Qualified how? Do their external relations, changed as these are in the new whole, fail to qualify them 'far' enough?*], and that in the second case there is a whole which differs both logically and psychologically from the first whole; and I urge that in contributing to the change the terms so far are altered'' (p. 579).

Not merely the relations, then, but the terms are altered: *und zwar* 'so far.' But just *how* far is the whole problem; and 'through-and-through' would seem (in spite of Mr. Bradley's somewhat undecided utterances[13]) to be the full Bradleyan answer. The 'whole' which he here treats as primary and determinative of each part's manner of 'contributing,' simply *must,* when it alters, alter in its entirety. There *must* be total conflux of its parts, each into and through each other. The 'must' appears here as a *Machtspruch,* as an *ipse dixit* of Mr. Bradley's absolutistically tempered 'understanding,' for he candidly confesses that how the parts *do* differ as they contribute to different wholes, is unknown to him (p. 578).

Although I have every wish to comprehend the authority by which Mr. Bradley's understanding speaks, his words leave me wholly unconverted. 'External relations' stand with their withers all unwrung, and remain, for aught he proves to the contrary, not only practically workable, but also perfectly intelligible factors in reality.

[13] I say 'undecided,' because, apart from the 'so far,' which sounds terribly half-hearted, there are passages in these very pages in which Mr. Bradley admits the pluralistic thesis. Read, for example, what he says, on p. 578, of a billiard ball keeping its 'character' unchanged, though, in its change of place, its 'existence' gets altered; or what he says, on p. 579, of the possibility that an abstract quality A, B, or C, in a thing, 'may throughout remain unchanged' although the thing be altered; or his admission that in red-hairedness, both as analyzed out of a man and when given with the rest of him, there may be 'no change' (p. 580): Why does he immediately add that for the pluralist to plead the non-mutation of such abstractions would be an *ignoratio elenchi?* It is impossible to admit it to be such. The entire *elenchus* and inquest is just as to whether parts which you can abstract from existing wholes can contribute to other wholes by a change of arrangement without change of nature. If they can thus mould the wholes into new *gestaltqualitäten,* then it follows that the same elements are logically able to exist in different wholes [whether physically able would depend on additional hypotheses]; that through-and-through change is not a dialectic necessity; that monism is only an hypothesis; and that an additively constituted universe is rationally thinkable. All the theses of radical empiricism, in short, follow.

VI

Mr. Bradley's understanding shows the most extraordinary power of perceiving separations and the most extraordinary impotence in comprehending conjunctions. One would naturally say 'neither or both,' but not so Mr. Bradley. When a common man analyzes certain *whats* from out the stream of experience he understands their distinctness *as thus isolated.* But this does not prevent him from equally well understanding their combination with each other *as originally experienced in the concrete,* or their confluence with new sensible experiences in which they recur as 'the same.' Returning into the stream of sensible presentation, nouns and adjectives and *thats* and abstracts grow confluent again, and the word 'is' names all these experiences of conjunction. Mr. Bradley understands the isolation of the abstracts, but to understand the combination is to him impossible.[14] "To understand a complex *AB,*" he says, "I must begin with *A* or *B.* And beginning, say with *A,* if I then merely find *B,* I have either lost *A,* or I have got beside *A,* [*the word 'beside' seems here vital*] something else, and in neither case have I understood.[15] For my intellect can not simply unite a diversity, nor has it in itself any form or way of togetherness, and you gain nothing if, beside *A* and *B,* you offer me their conjunction in fact. For to my intellect that is no more than another external element. And 'facts,' once for all, are for my intellect not true unless they satisfy it. . . . The intellect has in its nature no principle of mere togetherness" (pp. 570, 572).

Of course Mr. Bradley has a right to define 'intellect' as the power by which we perceive separations but not unions,—provided he give due notice to the reader. But why then claim that such a maimed and amputated power must reign supreme in philosophy? It is true that he elsewhere (p. 568) attributes to the intellect a *proprius motus* of transition, but says that when he looks for *these* transitions in the detail of living experience, he 'is unable to verify such a solution' (p. 569).

[14] So far as I catch his state of mind, it is somewhat like this: 'Book,' 'table,' 'on'—how does the existence of these three abstract elements result in *this* book being livingly on *this* table. Why isn't the table on the book? Or why dosn't the 'on' connect itself with another book, or something that is not a table? Mustn't something *in* each of the three elements already determine the two others to *it,* so that they do not settle elsewhere or float vaguely? Mustn't the *whole fact be prefigured in each part,* and exist *de jure* before it can exist *de facto?* But, if so, in what can the jural existence consist, if not in a spiritual miniature of the whole fact's constitution actuating every partial factor as its purpose? But is this anything but the old metaphysical fallacy of looking behind a fact *in esse* for the ground of the fact, and finding it in the shape of the very same fact *in posse.* Somewhere we must leave off with a *constitution* behind which there is nothing.

[15] Apply this to the case of 'book-on-table'! W. J.

Yet he never explains what the intellectual transitions would be like in case we had them. He only defines them negatively—they are not spatial, temporal, predicative, or causal; or qualitatively or otherwise serial; or in any way relational as we naïvely trace relations, for relations separate terms, and need themselves to be hitched on *ad infinitum*. The nearest approach he makes to describing a truly intellectual transition is where he speaks of *A* and *B* as being 'united, each from its own nature, in a whole which is the nature of both alike' (p. 570). But this (which, *pace* Mr. Bradley, seems exquisitely analogous to 'taking' a congeries in a 'lump,' if not to 'swamping') suggests nothing but that *conflux* which pure experience so abundantly offers, as when 'space,' 'white' and 'sweet' are confluent in a 'lump of sugar,' or kinesthetic, dermal and optical sensations confluent in 'my hand.'[16] All that I can verify in the transitions which Mr. Bradley's intellect desiderates as its *proprius motus* is a reminiscence of these and other sensible conjunctions (especially space-conjunctions), but a reminiscence so vague that its originals are not recognized. Bradley in short repeats the fable of the dog, the bone, and its image in the water. With a world of particulars, given in loveliest union, in conjunction definitely various, and variously definite, the 'how' of which you 'understand' as soon as you see the fact of them,[17] for there is no how except the constitution of the fact as given; with all this given him, I say, in pure experience, he asks for some ineffable union in the abstract instead, which, if he gained it, would only be a duplicate of what he has already in his full possession. Surely he abuses the privilege which society grants to all us philosophers, of being puzzle-headed.

Polemic writing like this is odious; but with absolutism in possession in so many quarters, omission to defend my radical empiricism against its best known champion, would count as either superficiality or inability. I have to conclude that its dialectic has not invalidated in the least degree the usual conjunctions by which the world, as experienced, hangs so variously together. In particular it leaves my empirical theory of knowledge[18] intact, and lets us continue to believe with common sense that one object *may* be known, if we have any ground for thinking that it *is* known, to many knowers.

[16] How meaningless is the contention that in such wholes (or in 'book-on-table,' 'watch-in-pocket,' etc.) the relation is an additional entity *between* the terms, needing itself to be related! Both Bradley (A. and R., pp. 32–3) and Royce ('The World and the Individual,' I., 128) lovingly repeat this piece of profundity.

[17] The 'why' and the 'whence' are entirely other questions, not under discussion, as I understand Mr. Bradley. Not how experience gets itself born, but how it can be what it is after it is born, is the puzzle.

[18] Above, p. 538.

In another article I shall return to this last supposition, which seems to me to offer other difficulties much harder for a philosophy of pure experience to deal with than any of absolutism's dialectic objections.

WILLIAM JAMES.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

SOCIETIES

THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

THE American Philosophical Association held its fourth meeting at the University of Pennsylvania on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, December 28–30, 1904. There were morning and afternoon sessions on Wednesday and Thursday and a morning session on Friday. The session on Tuesday afternoon was commemorative of Immanuel Kant, the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology assisting. Professor Addison W. Moore, was expected to read a paper on 'Pure and Practical Reason in Locke,' in commemoration of the bicentenary of the death of John Locke, but, unfortunately, he was unable to attend the meeting. On Thursday morning the association united with the American Psychological Association in a joint session, Professor William James presiding. The president of the association, Professor George Trumbull Ladd, read his address on Thursday evening, in Price Hall, on 'The Mission of Philosophy.' The address was followed by a smoker at the Colonnade Hotel, in which the members of the American Psychological Association joined. The annual dinner of the American Society of Naturalists and affiliated societies was held at the Hotel Walton on Wednesday evening and was largely attended by members of the association. At the business meeting on Thursday afternoon the following officers were elected: President, Professor John Dewey; Vice-President, Professor J. A. Leighton; Secretary-Treasurer, Professor J. G. Hibben; new members of the Executive Committee, Professor H. N. Gardiner and Dr. R. B. Perry. The other members of the Executive Committee are Professors James H. Tufts and H. Heath Bawden, and the retiring members Professors William A. Hammond and F. J. E. Woodbridge. The next meeting of the association will be held in Emerson Hall, Harvard University, in acceptance of the invitation of the Harvard department of philosophy, presented to the association by Professor Münsterberg.

The sessions were well attended, but there was not as much discussion as at other meetings. The following papers were read:

Knowledge as the Subject of Epistemology: WALTER T. MARVIN.

The subject of epistemology is knowledge completely rationalized, which is never a concrete psychosis, but which does exist as an element in some psychoses. A complete list of concrete instances of cognition would include psychoses all the way from dawning intelligence to reasoning. In the higher instances, analysis would reveal three distinct elements: first, a non-rational element, an element of invention or discovery; secondly, a rational, a reflective, a cautious or conservative element, an awareness of the judgment involved and an inhibitant of any tendency to go beyond the warranted; thirdly, an awareness that our knowledge is about to result in conduct. The first and third of these elements are non-rational. This leaves the second element alone a truly rational element. Its office is to narrow down the field of risk in both the foregoing elements. It can help us to discovery only by preventing us from going far afield, by keeping our hypotheses within the limits that promise success. It can verify our hypotheses by ascertaining whether or not they have worked. A study of this rational element shows that it is engaged only with present data. It is the struggle of the mind towards complete rationality that alone may be called valid or invalid, and that forms the true subject of epistemological study.

The Something in Thought Besides Idea: EDWARD S. STEELE.

The most obtrusive symbol of thought is that of image, or picture, *i. e.,* of idea; but a second more fundamental symbol is that afforded by language, in which thought appears as discourse. Both of these points of view must be harmonized in any adequate theory. The common logic seems to cover both, but difficulties arise in its psychological application. By Locke ideas are placed outside of perception as its objects. Hume abolishes the perception and leaves only the ideas, thus excluding the logical function. Reid restores ideas to their place inside the act of predication, both elsewhere and in sense perception, and thus practically makes the judgment the universal norm of thought. A predication contains ideas and something extra-ideal—the latter the goal of the paper. Dr. James recognizes under the term, 'psychic fringe,' an extra-ideal element in consciousness corresponding, in part at least, to the logical element. The extra-ideal factor, according to this paper, consists in what is known as 'logical form.' Logical form is exhibited in certain uniformities of thought which run crosswise both of objective content and of psychological distinctions such as intuition and reflection. It is no physical determination, but part of the meaning of the thought, yet no part of the objective content; therefore describable as a subjective content, if thereby we understand a meaning merely for the thought process. The copula is the pivot of

logical form; no isolated item, but of a closed system of logical schematism. Logical content is merely of functional value and its ontological application is purely illusive.

The Growth of Concepts: GEORGE R. MONTGOMERY.

Concepts do not spring into consciousness through experience, nor are they fixed in their meaning. They are to be regarded as variables, functions one of another, in the sense in which calculus uses the word function. In calculus a number is not a magnitude but expresses a relation; therefore calculus is best fitted to represent the real characteristics of concepts, that is, the transitive states as well as the substantive. A concept is not a simple affair but a larger or smaller portion of the analytic-synthetic process which constitutes experience. The 'fringe' includes the parts into which the concept is analyzed and the whole a part of whose analysis the concept is. The epistemological unit is not, therefore, the sensation, nor the term or the proposition with the copula, but the analytic-synthetic triad; and the proposition with the copula is merely one leg of the analysis. A judgment like 'John struck James' or 'it rains' is an ordinary concept, and is thus to be regarded in grammar and logic.

Truth and Practice: A. E. TAYLOR.

The Metaphysical Status of Universals: WILMON H. SHELDON.

Whatever is concrete has a positive metaphysical reality, though perhaps not the highest degree of reality. The universal is supposed by many to be essentially not concrete and therefore to have a lower metaphysical status than concrete individual facts or events. This supposition rests on a misapprehension of the nature of a universal. It should be defined not as a permanent entity incapable of complete realization in experience and indifferent thereto, but as a particular image or response plus a fringe, a suggestion of further possible similar images or responses, which the former, having been associated with similars, gradually acquires. The suggestion is due not to our mind, but to the nature of the particular content; it is a concrete fringe of the image or response. Thus a universal is quite concrete, and is as real as any individual fact or event.

Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics: JOSIAH ROYCE.

The certainty of mathematical science depends, according to Kant, entirely upon the necessity which our forms of perception possess, which forms are for us absolutely predetermined by our constitution. The mathematicians since the time of Kant have tended more and more to follow the very direction which he would have warned them not to follow. Namely, they have on the whole increasingly forsaken the method of trusting to perceptual con-

struction as a means of mathematical demonstration. Geometry without diagrams is now the order of the day amongst the most vigorous students of the bases of geometry. A Kantian form of intuition, if you can prove its existence in our own nature, has absolutely no interest as the foundation of any mathematical science, except in so far as it may suggest to some mathematician the particular ideal topics upon which he finds it convenient to build up a mathematical theory. On the other hand, the immortal soul of the Kantian doctrine of the forms of intuition remains this, that thinking itself is a kind of experience, that true thinking is synthetic as well as analytic, is engaged in construction of a peculiar kind, and not in mere barren analyses such as the statements that all rational animals are rational. Kant was right in saying that the novelties of mathematical science are due to the observation of the results of constructive processes. Kant's theory of the basis of mathematics has thus been in one respect wholly abandoned, and properly so, by the modern logic of mathematics. In another respect, precisely in so far as Kant declared that constructive synthesis and observation of its ideal results are both necessary for mathematics, Kant was unquestionably right. And, as nobody before him had so clearly seen this fact, and as the progress of mathematical logic since his time has been so profoundly influenced by his criticisms, we owe to him an enormous advance in our reflective insight in this field.

Kant's Attitude towards Idealism and Realism: EDWARD F. BUCHNER.

This paper discussed not the logical implication of Kant's system but his own notions of what idealism and realism taught in the eighteenth century. It sketched the successive interpretations of the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' from that of Garve, in 1782, to that of Schopenhauer. It gave a chronological list of passages from Kant's books and fragments under these headings: his conception of idealism and realism; his classification of idealists and realists; his own impressions of what he taught; his rejoinders to critics; his refutations of idealism. Much may thus be learned of his great motives. The conclusions reached were: (1) Kant's criticism of the extant forms of idealism and realism is due to ambiguity in his use of the terms 'external,' 'outside us,' 'experience,' etc. (2) Kant argues against Berkeleian idealism, first, from his doctrine of things-in-themselves, later, from the existence of things in space. His doctrine of *noumena* is vital in his system. (3) In 1787 and later, Kant's thinking shifted to psychological grounds, proceeding contradictorily to the Deduction and the Paralogisms. (4) Kant's real and apparent inconsistencies may be reconciled by noting that,

while as to experience and knowledge he taught a new idealism, as to faith he taught a new realism. Criticism thus was an articulation of ideal-realism and real idealism.

The Present Significance of Kant's Ethics: WILLIAM CALDWELL.

This significance is due, of course, to Kant's spiritual philosophy of human nature. This spiritual philosophy is implied in all present and recent attempts to treat the moral judgment as one of valuation. It is also implied in recent epistemological assumptions about personality, and it constitutes a basis for the theory of sovereignty or autonomy implied in the ethics of social democracy. Neo-Hegelian criticism of Kant's moral standard has overlooked the two more socialized expressions given to it by Kant. The independence of ethics both of metaphysics and of naturalism is an important part of Kant's teaching—the fact that ethics is more calculated to give to, than to take from metaphysics—the latter thing having been tried unsuccessfully by the English neo-Hegelians until the recent criticisms of Bradley and Taylor. Again, Kant's emphasis on the standard as the law of personal dealing in a social realm frees us from many of the difficulties of the much-vaunted *teleological* moral philosophy of the present, casuistry and indifferentism or indeterminateness being the faults of the latter. Kant's version of the standard is also the one that is most consonant with a true theory of moral progress.

The Significant and the Non-essential in the Æsthetics of Kant: JAMES H. TUFTS.

Regarding as non-essential the arrangement under the categories, and the machinery of the separate faculties with their supposed interaction, we may single out as the more essential elements of Kant's thought the following: (1) The social reference implied in the æsthetic judgment. The æsthetic may be said to 'find me' more deeply and broadly than the agreeable. (2) The emphasis upon the freedom and the enlarging quality of the æsthetic consciousness. The æsthetic is thus distinguished both from the routine of habit and from the abstract concepts of scientific interest. (3) The recognition of the negative or tensional factor in the consciousness of the sublime. (4) The treatment of the æsthetic as an organic part of life and philosophy. It is fatal to the æsthetic to be abstracted from full experience, and conversely, philosophy, in seeking a point of view for considering life as a whole, can not ignore the æsthetic phases of consciousness as above indicated.

The Influence of Kant on Theology: GEORGE W. KNOX.

The influence of Kant on theology has been in three principal lines. First, certain theologians accepted the arguments of the

'Critique of the Pure Reason' and the conclusion that God is therefore unknowable. None the less they attempted a theology by exalting faith in revelation through the church and the Holy Scriptures, thus maintaining that that which is unknowable by reason may be accepted by faith. The second movement followed the lines laid down by Schleiermacher on the one side and Hegel on the other. Accepting the position of Kant as destructive of the old conception of God, they attempt to find him immanent in the world of feeling and of reason. Under the influence of Hegel theology was reconstructed, the central point being given to the doctrine of the Trinity, though this was stated in forms scarcely in accordance with the tradition of the church. The theology, however, suffered the fate of the philosophy and has now few representatives. The third movement may be called neo-Kantian, and it is often designated by the name Ritschl. Ritschl, however, obtained his epistemology through Lotze, though in his later period he made a renewed study of Kant, not perhaps altogether to the advantage of his system. This school holds theology to be a practical science, its relationship to metaphysics being only the relationship which all sciences must hold to it, and its material being given in the facts of the religious experience of mankind.

Kant and Aquinas (by title): BROTHER CHRYSOSTOM.

Five such centuries as separated Kant from Aquinas must have entailed a marked difference in point of view Yet it is surprising how many points of contact may be found between the Angel of the Schools and the Philosopher of Koenigsberg. In the thirteenth century there were extremes to reconcile: in the world of action, we find the spiritual and the temporal; in the world of thought, nominalism and realism; in the theological world, Gentilism and Christianity. Thus the young Aquinas was forced to go back of differences to a common ground if he would construct a really effective *synthetic* philosophy. In the days of Kant, the conflict was supposed to be between dogmatism and skepticism, and Kant, too, went back to the parting of the ways to get the principles of his *analytic* philosophy. But his excessive distrust of the principle of authority, the solitary life which he led, and the mental rigidity which marks him off from even such mathematicians as Descartes and Spinoza, prevented him from giving his system a solid foundation in the real order. On the other hand, to exceptional natural gifts Aquinas joined the advantages of travel and of special instruction under one of the most learned men of the day; for Albertus Magnus united theory and practice, speculation and experiment. To the precision of the logician he added the skill of the poet and was therefore the possessor of sympathy and insight. A detailed

comparison of the limitations of our cognitive powers as viewed by both Kant and Aquinas brings out many more points of contact, and is a suggestive and profitable study.

The five papers following were read at the joint session with the American Psychological Association.

Wundtian Feeling: Analysis and the Genetic Significance of Feeling: MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

The elaborate analysis of feelings which forms the most important part of Wundt's revised system of psychology is incompatible with his doctrine that feeling is purely subjective and based on the reaction of a simple apperception center. In particular, every attempt to explain the relation between a feeling quality and its components, or complex feeling and their partial feelings, results in referring the complexity to the sensational basis of the feeling. Analysis and subjectivity are incompatible notions. The chief source of perplexity in the problem of feeling lies in the failure to recognize intermediate stages between feeling and sensation; processes which, while they ordinarily go unanalyzed because there is no need for analyzing them, may with practiced introspection be recognized as complexes of organic sensation. To this class belong strain and relaxation, excitement and depression. Subjective is that which resists analysis, qualitative and local; objective, that which allows it. Only pleasantness and unpleasantness are ultimately subjective in this sense.

The Mutual Isolation of Minds: DICKINSON S. MILLER.

Consciousness as distinct from its contents resolves itself into a relation of coexperience or empirical conjunction between contents. Contents not bearing this relation to each other are isolated in an ultimate sense. A group of coexperienced contents which as a whole is isolated is what we call a state or field of consciousness. To it every other state or field is, in Clifford's term, ejective. The disjunction of experiences is absolute and admits of no degrees. The same may be said of their conjunction. A consciousness foreign to my own is for me a 'thing-in-itself.' To say that we can know nothing of things-in-themselves is to say that we can know nothing of our neighbor's mind. To say that one content can be in two fields at once, or that a field may be a part of a larger field without consciousness of the fact is to contradict oneself. The absolute discontinuity between fields of consciousness must be recognized by such doctrines of panpsychism as would transfer the continuities of the physical world of science to a world of sentiency. The category of ejectivity or disjunction is of peculiar interest for the theory of knowledge. It is the fixed indisposition to contemplate

the content of a conceived foreign field as part of my own conceived field.

The Nature of Consciousness: FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE.

Consciousness can not be defined in isolation, but only as it is given with a variety of contents as different as ideas and things, as an instance of that type of existence which may be described as the existence of different things together. Space, time and species are other instances of the same type, and afford such striking parallels to consciousness that consciousness may be defined as of the same general nature, namely, as a form of continuum or connection between objects. Such a definition reduces the problem of the relation of consciousness to other things to the problem of the relation of a continuum to the things contained. The distinctive feature of the connection of objects in consciousness is that in such connection they become representative of each other, and thus make knowledge possible. It is to be noted that both the actual contents and limitations of knowledge are determined solely by the relation of objects to each other. Knowledge is palpably realistic. The most crucial instance of this realism is the discovery that consciousness has antecedent conditions of existence. These conditions appear to be events of the world which is eventually in consciousness, so that consciousness may be regarded as a special form of continuum or connection in which the events of the world may exist.

A Suggestive Case of Nerve Anastomosis: GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.

This particular case of nerve anastomosis was performed by Dr. Harvey Cushing, of Baltimore, in the spring of 1902. It consisted of uniting the distal end of the facial nerve with the central end of the accessory nerve of the shoulder. Through persistent efforts at voluntary control during 287 days, at the end of this period the action of the individual groups of muscles of the face had completely returned and could be effected without associated movements of the shoulder or contraction in other facial muscles, and emotional expression had considerably improved, although not to the same extent. An analysis of the phenomena seems to show that, under the stimulus of will, the cortical center of the accessory nerve had assumed new and more complicated functions. Such astonishing results from persistent volitional efforts seem to add their testimony to scores of other facts in discrediting both the idealistic and the psycho-physical parallelistic theories of the relations of body and mind.

The System of Values: HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

The aim is to classify our absolute values, those experiences, that is, which we appreciate for their own sake, and secondly to examine

whether one common principle controls the whole system. If we seek absolute values, we must take the standpoint of immediate experience and not the standpoint of causal science, which is itself the product of valuation, inasmuch as it has transformed reality in the service of certain valuable logical purposes. We find values in four spheres: firstly, in related experiences; secondly, in isolated experiences; thirdly, in the changes of experience; and fourthly, in the supplementations of experience. Each time we have to separate the given and the created values. In the related experiences we find the value of validity, to which we submit; it is given as existential knowledge and created as scientific knowledge. In isolated experiences we find the value of perfection, which we enjoy; it is given in harmony and created in beauty of art. In the changes of experiences we find the value of achievement, which we approve; it is given as development and created as civilization. In the supplements to experience we find the value of completeness, in which we believe; it is given as religious conviction and created as philosophical conviction. There is one category common to all these classes of values: the category of identity. As the same simple principle of attraction controls the changes of the physical world from the falling apple to the moving star, the same simple principle of identity determines value in the world of subjects from the beauty of a circle or the truth of arithmetic to the highest morality and philosophy and religion.

Consciousness in the Brutes: GEORGE V. N. DEARBORN.

The presumption that the nervous system is the physical basis of consciousness is unwarranted (as was Descartes's location of the soul in the pineal gland) because the metabolism of the nervous system is inadequate to the empirical nature of the mental process. On the other hand the unique complexity of the structure and the metabolism of protoplasm in general corresponds more nearly to the intensity and the extensity of empirical consciousness. The nearly perfect analogy between the anatomy and the physiology of man and those of the most complex brutes amounts to a demonstration of the latter's consciousness, while the principle of continuity warrants a belief that all animals are conscious, the simplest experiencing little but sensation and 'will,' while cognition develops probably with the comprehending functions of the nervous system.

The Psychological Self and the Actual Personality: J. A. LEIGHTON.

There is a deeper and more fundamental method of considering the actual self than any afforded by psychology. Structural psychology must, in its analytic procedure, treat consciousness as a complex of static, given elements so that it could never lay hold on the actual, living self which is immediately experienced as a moving

and dynamic unity. The actual self remains always the limiting presupposition of structural analysis. Functional psychology endeavors to do justice to the prospective, teleological character of the self-unity. But it has tended to rest satisfied with biological categories and has not seen that its genetic account of self-activity as end-seeking involves a philosophy, *i. e.*, a theory of the relation of self to environment. The actual personality realizes itself as a rational, teleological activity only in and through *culture-systems* in morals, science, religion, etc. The real self finds itself through active attitudes in relation to the totality of the culture-life. This life is historical, social, spiritual. It is created, embodied and transformed in and by personalities. The transcendent presupposition, then, of the entire culture-life is the reality of ultimate self-active, spiritual unities which come to expression in empirical individuals. If we ask, not what is the presupposition of exact science, but what is the presupposition of human culture, we are led back to a hyper-empirical principle in personality, and so, widening the transcendental inquiry, we shall arrive, not at a *Bewusstsein überhaupt* as the ultimate condition of science, but at a transcendent principle of personality as the condition of civilization.

The Relational Theory of Consciousness: W. P. MONTAGUE.

The new movement in favor of a relational theory of consciousness is to be welcomed in the interest of a scientific psychology. It is however seriously hampered by a failure on the part of most of its advocates to realize the incompatibility of any form of idealism with the view that consciousness is a relation between its objects, and not something in which they inhere. Things must be before they can be related, hence if consciousness is a relation no object can depend for its existence upon the fact that it is perceived. In short the realistic theory of the world is a necessary implication of the relational theory of consciousness; while, conversely, if we follow common sense in admitting the objective reality of both primary and secondary qualities, there will be no temptation to treat consciousness as anything other than a special relation between an organism and its environment. Realism and the relational view of consciousness are strictly correlative. They are different aspects of the same truth, and can not be defended or understood apart from one another.

An Interpretation of Aristotle, De anima III., 7, 431 a 16–b 1: WM. ROMAINE NEWBOLD.

Chapters four to eight of this book are occupied by the Theory of Reason. This paragraph is not, as is commonly supposed, a digression, repeating the theory already given of the simultaneous

perception of disparate sense presentations. It is essentially an application of that theory to the simultaneous apprehension of the intuition of Reason and some other content. In it Aristotle makes four points: (1) The intuition of Reason always occurs in conjunction with a representation of phantasy. (2) The mental content whereby we apprehend *that in which* the representations differ itself contains the intuitions or concepts of both. (3) The manner in which the two intuitions and (4) the representation and its intuition are simultaneously apprehended, is proved by proportions. These proportions should be interpreted in accordance with the principle upon which convertibility rests. The latter was certainly known to Aristotle; it was probably the discovery of Eudoxus.

Primary and Secondary Phases of Causality. Natural Science Founded on the Latter and Theology on the Former: WILLIAM T. HARRIS.

In our common thinking we are apt to suppose that a chain of secondary causality can be thought by itself without the need of a first cause; but this view does not bear examination, for any link which originated causality would in so far have to be a first or primordial cause not deriving that causality from beyond, but, through its own energy, generating a transmitting cause. It follows that all secondary causes belong to the pole of the effect. An infinite effect presupposes an infinite cause which originates an infinite causal influence transmitted to this infinite sphere of effect. Suppose that the infinite chain of secondary causes does *not* demand as its logical condition a first cause which originates its causal energy and is not dependent itself upon a chain of causality. In that case there is no causality to transmit. No link originates any causality to transmit, and causality according to this view comes from no other source. This is the annihilation of all causality because there is no origination, and consequently there can be no transference, of causality. Science, as well as philosophy, with this becomes an illusion, and things and events also become illusions because they only *seem* to arise through a transforming causal influence in the world.

The Agnosticism of Herbert Spencer (by title): GABRIEL CAMPBELL.

Herbert Spencer was by heredity a nonconformist, his father even dissenting from the dissenters, the son displaying an impulsive antipathy to authority, political as well as religious, expressions of adoration never finding in him any echoes. Bodily infirmity prevented his attending school and devoting himself to books; he was thus debarred from becoming a scholar in philosophy or an expert in science. Mentally a castle-builder, with the ambition of a re-

UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS LIBRARY 107177

former, his copious writings are sagely devised, but impracticable. He early championed evolutionism, aiming to displace a sovereign ruler who is creative or self-revealing. Characterizing the absolute reality as unknowable, he passes mechanically from the biological to the psychological. The emotive life is developed from the corporeal; intuitions fail to give men absolute ideals; irreversible law excludes freedom of will. In his theory of education he ignores the study of humanity in its higher ranges, the classic development of language, art, ethics and religion. His absolute morality would be intermediary between empiricism and idealism, but does not bring man into free affiliation with a divine (Kantian) kingdom of righteousness. In religion Spencer recognizes rather the utilitarian animal than the immortal; the savage state seems more suggestive than Christianity. While he finds religion indispensable and based on our consciousness of the infinite and eternal source of all energy, his theistic ideas are incoherent, God unknowable; Spencer does not find our highest and best intellection developed in terms of the absolutely real.

Deism in America: I. Woodbridge Riley.

Confining itself to the rise of deism in Yale College, the paper discusses the deistic influences in the writings of Bishop Berkeley, Dr. Samuel Johnson, Rector Clapp and President Stiles. The latter's reading of Shaftsbury, Leland, Middleton, Hume and Lord Kames is shown to have incited Stiles's remarkable appeal for freedom of thought, now first given in its entirety from hitherto unpublished documents.

Philosophy and Immortality: Frank S. Hoffmann.

The doctrine of human immortality is now seriously questioned. Being a future event it can never be more than probable. Even if it could be shown that some men have survived death, that would not prove that all will. A study of the origin and nature of man, developing into a being capable of knowing himself and investigating the ultimate ground of things, creates a probability in favor of his endless life. The argument against this view derived from the known interdependence of mind and brain is nullified by accepting the transmission theory of James as more likely than the production theory of Duhring, or the combination theory of Clifford. The probability of human immortality is further increased when we consider the plan or purpose that the universe manifests. If to the two great facts of the material universe, the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of physical energy, we add the conservation of personality, the harmony of the system of things as a whole is put upon solid ground. Grant the absolute goodness of

God, and the endless life of man seems to follow as a necessary corollary. It would be unworthy of God to annihilate man almost as he begins the use of his higher powers. Life and immortality are brought to light just in proportion as man comes to realize his own dignity and to put a correct estimate upon his own worth.

Gambling as Play: Its Nature and the Moral Character of It: HERBERT G. LORD.

This discussion originated in the attempt to define precisely what constitutes gambling. The objective mark is found to lie not in the presence of chance nor even in an excess of it, since this is characteristic of many other of the transactions of life; but in that the stake is provided by the contestants, and what one gains others lose. So in all gambling it is, and is meant to be. The subjective mark lies in the invariable presence of two impulses, the strife and the gain impulses. Other elements might or might not be present; these always are, though in varying degrees of intensity. This definition made, several different types of gambling were found, only two of which were distinguished from each other: gambling as play, and gambling as business. No well-grounded basis for condemnation of the former was found, when conducted under proper conditions and with a right mental attitude. It may, perhaps, even be both a healthful recreation and a method of gaining control of very insistent impulses.

Remarks on Ethical Method: HENRY W. WRIGHT.

The concept of evolution when applied to morality promises to be helpful in reconciling the conflicting claims of Hedonism and Intuitionism. From the evolutionary view-point, moral development appears as a process of organization governed by the laws of differentiation and integration. Thus, on the one hand, moral development has underlying unity despite its continuous change. We find a characteristic manifestation of this unity in *purposive* or *voluntary activity,* an activity which pervades the whole sphere of morality and is a mark of its real identity. Furthermore, purposive activity embraces elements of cognition, feeling and effort, and is itself an organizing agency inasmuch as it adjusts new objects to the systematic totality of individual life. But, on the other hand, moral development presents continuous difference within its essential unity. These changes, which the unitary principle undergoes, are largely determined by the nature of the evolution, as the process whereby a specific material (*i. e.,* primitive conduct) is organized. Hence we expect to find in morality different forms of purposive activity which are recognized as necessary stages or moments in moral development. Such are the common ad-

mitted virtues. We may distinguish three forms of purposive activity which are necessary stages in moral development. These forms of action are directed to the pursuit of (1) the single object of impulse, (2) total individual interest, and (3) social welfare. In (2) the virtues of *Temperance* and *Prudence* are involved; in (3) those of *Justice* and *Benevolence.*

Stages of the Discussion of Evolutionary Ethics: THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

During the last half-century the leading issues of this discussion have changed repeatedly. Until comparatively recently the bearing upon ethics of the theory of organic evolution received most attention; but since social evolution has been shown to be essentially peculiar in its laws and factors, the importance of biological conceptions and analogies in the consideration of moral facts has become evident. In the earlier (biological) period of the discussion, three stages can be distinguished. The first is that of ethics *versus* evolution; an incompatibility asserted both by opponents of evolution and by moral sceptics. The second is that of the imitational ethics criticized by Huxley; according to which the laws of organic evolution are a standard for moral conduct. The third is that of the systems of Spencer, Stephen and their allies, who explain morality as essentially a biological variation which more effectually secures the ends of previously existing functions. More recently a tendency has become marked to concentrate attention—even within the field of social evolution—upon the specifically ethical rather than upon ethiconomic factors. Questions of method are now paramount. Those who deny the applicability of the genetic method to ethics sometimes confuse present with earlier stages; sometimes ignore the light which, when the past is interpreted in terms of the present, may thereby shine on the present itself.

Is There a Distinct Logic of Historical Construction? PERCY HUGHES.

No concept of historical construction is in common acceptance; and that of action is proposed. The constructive historian presents a synthesis of many actions in the one they constitute, which synthesis, in turn, is at the same time a means of added activity in the parts. Hence in historical, as contrasted with mechanical causation, the parts explain the whole only by presupposing it, that is, as parts of it. For history seeks appreciation, not control. To recognize this concept is to see in the teaching of history primarily the presentation of those greater agencies in which each man has a part, as nature, the nation, civilization, or humanity; and to extend the scope of historical construction, so that man's place in other than

merely social movements can be recognized; while such lines of development as the economic, the social, the political, which at present lack definition, will be defined in terms of their direction, and will be compared, not as now in terms of causation, but through evaluation.

Methods of Studying the History of Philosophy (by title): J. MACBRIDE STERRETT.

Definition and function of philosophy in contrast with, and fulfillment of, that of science. Relation of the history of philosophy to philosophy. Organic view—the work of the same mind through the ages on the problem of the constitutive principle of all experience. The value of the study depends upon the method employed, as well as upon one's conception of the nature and function of philosophy. Two opposing dicta—(1) Each system refutes the preceding one so that there is no result. (2) No system of philosophy has ever been refuted. The organic view holds the latter doctrine. One system annuls another only by fulfilling it and reducing it to an organic factor of a more concrete view. Methods: (1) The biographical method—The personality of the thinker is of no philosophical interest. (2) The merely historical or learned method—Plato taught this, Aristotle taught that. (3) The merely sceptical method. (4) The eclectic method—A thesaurus of doctrines. (5) The *tendenz* method—Lewes rather than Hegel for illustration. (6) The modern historical method—Put yourself in the environment with Plato. (7) The critical method—the dialectic of development. (8) The philosophical method—Hegel as type in contrast with Lewes. The living organic view *vs.* the mortuary one—a sequence of funerals of systems with cosmic suicide of thought at its close.

NOTES AND NEWS

THE color-equations worked out in my *Experimental Psychology* were made with the Wundt papers supplied by E. Zimmermann. The series consisted of twelve colors, besides black and white. I chose these coated papers, in preference to the Hering tissue papers, because I had found in practice that they were much more durable.

I had no reason, at the time, to suppose that this set of papers would be changed. A consignment received from Zimmermann last spring consisted, however, partly of the original coated papers and partly of Hering tissue papers. A mixed series of this sort is, of course, very unsatisfactory for laboratory work. Herr Zimmermann has given me no explanation of the change. Since it is possible that similar mixed series may be sent to other psychologists, it seems worth while to say that my

equations hold, not for the new, but only for the original Zimmermann papers.

I have recently seen samples of a new set of coated papers, which Rothe is selling in place of the Hering tissue papers. There are twelve colors, with a black and a baryta white, and they appear to form a very even set. Whether the Hering velvet black can still be obtained I do not know; it is a black that one would be sorry to lose, although it fades so quickly that one can hardly employ it in ordinary laboratory practice. I have advised the C. H. Stoelting Company of Chicago (successor to the Chicago Laboratory Supply and Scale Company) to import these new Hering papers. Samples can be obtained now, and the papers will probably be on sale in a few weeks.

E. B. TITCHENER.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

THE Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology held its first annual meeting on December 27–29, 1904. A session of the Society was held at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., on December 27 with the following program: 'The Poggendorff Illusion,' W. M. STEELE; 'Influence of Secondary Stimuli in certain Complex Perceptions,' HAYWOOD J. PEARCE; 'Some Oddities of Sensory Discrimination and Memory,' G. M. STRATTON; 'The Meaning of Analysis in Psychology,' EDWARD A. PACE; 'The Introspective Method,' J. W. BAIRD; 'A Comparative Study of Religious Systems,' D. B. PURINTON; 'Philosophy as Developed according to the Tendencies of the American Mind,' GEORGE L. RAYMOND; Address by the President, J. MARK BALDWIN. The session then adjourned to Philadelphia, where it held a joint meeting with the American Philosophical Association in commemoration of the centenary of the death of Immanuel Kant.

As already announced in this JOURNAL, the Fifth International Congress of Psychology will meet at Rome, April 26–30, 1905. Professor Luigi Luciani, as honorary president, Professor Giuseppe Sergi, as president, Professor Augusto Tamburini, as general secretary, Professor Sante De Sanctis, as vice-secretary general, Dr. G. C. Ferrari, as assistant secretary, and Dr. Giovanni Luccio, as treasurer, constitute the executive committee of the congress. The sectional presidents are as follows: experimental psychology, Professor G. Fano; introspective psychology, Professor R. Ardigo; pathological psychology, Professor E. Morselli; criminal, pedagogical and social psychology, Professor C. Lombroso. American psychologists are represented on the International Committee by Professors Baldwin, Hall, James, Ladd, Münsterberg and Titchener. For information relative to the organization and work of the congress, Professor Sante De Sanctis should be addressed at Instituto fisiologico, 92 Via Depretis, Rome. Members of the International Committee may also be addressed and are authorized to receive applications for membership in the congress.

AT the recent Philadelphia meeting of the American Society of Naturalists, Professor William James, of Harvard University, was elected president.